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Abstract
Our research efforts in year 2 had the following objectives:
• Determine whether there are status- and gender-related variations in monitoring and
challenging strategies employed by U.S. pilots
• Expand the project to non-U.S, pilots
Progress on each of these objectives will be described in the following sections.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19980211146 2020-06-16T00:00:14+00:00Z
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Are there status-based differences in monitoring
and challenging strategies?
Participants
1000 test booklets were mailed to representatives of three major U.S. carriers who
distributed the material among their pilots. 161 pilots returned the material. Of these, 9
responses by captains and 8 by first officers had to be excluded since they failed to comply
with the instructions, either by skipping scenarios or by providing non-verbatim responses.
Of the remaining 63 captain participants, 21 were from airline 1, 17 from airline 2, and 25
from airline 3. Of the remaining 81 fn'st officer participants, 27 were from airline 1, 22
from airline 2, and 32 from airline 3.
Material
The experimental material was developed and pretested during year 1 of this
research project as detailed in last year's progress report, and will thus only be summarized
here. A test booklet consisted of eight short vignettes, each printed on a separate page.
The vignettes described aviation incidents which varied in type and severity. For captain
participants, incidents were narrated from the perspective of the captain and involved errors
or oversights of the first officer, the pilot-flying. The reverse set-up was used in booklets
designed for first officer participants. Random ordering of the vignettes yielded 16
different captains' and first officers' editions.
.Method and Procedure
There were two tasks: a Discourse Completion Task and then a Judgment Task. In
the Discourse Completion Task, participants received the incident descriptions followed by
a goal statement. Participants were asked to imagine themselves in the position of the
captain (or the first officer - dependent on the crew position of the participant) and to write
otit verbatim what they would say to the first officer (or the captain) in order to achieve the
stated goal. In the Judgment Task, participants were asked to rate the scenarios along
various scales, such as threat to flight safety. Ratings along the scales could range from 1
to 9.
Analyses
Request _t12¢_._. The coding scheme developed during the pretesting of the material
was adopted for this larger data set; except for a few changes aimed at systematizing earlier
categories. Previously we had distinguished between two major classes of
communications: those that referred to actions to be taken by the speaker himself and those
in which the speaker requested actions to be taken by the listener. Included in this latter
category were communications addressing crew actions. In the revised coding scheme, we
treated crew-centered communications as a separate category. As previously, these major
categories were further divided into sub-classes of communications based on the extent to
which they committed the speaker, the listener, or the crew to a particular action.
Complexity_ of the communications. As was done for the preliminary data, we
noted whether the responses were simple or complex. Complex communications consisted
of several utterances. Typically one of them was the principal part, or primary move, that
realized the goal stated after each incident description, and the other parts provided
justification. A variation of complex responses consisted of several primary moves which
together realized the stated intention but in which one also gave a rationale for the other.
Simple communications, in contrast, were responses in which a given goal was realized by
a single utterance, i.e., a single primary move.
Results and Discussion
Request types. Captains and first officers used distinct request strategies. As can
be seen in Figure 1, the request types were differently distributed across the two groups
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(,)(2(8, N = 1569) = 273.96; p < .0001). Captains most frequently issued commands.
36% of their requests were of this type as compared to 10% for first officers. First
officers' predominant strategy, in contrast, was to alert the captain to a problem or to
remind him of a given target speed or altitude. 27% of the first officers' requests were
strong hints, i.e.; alerts, problem and goal statements. Eleven percent of the captains'
communications fell into this category.
Figure 1: Distribution of Request Types used by Captains and First Officers
40
Request Type
Captains from the three airlines were consistent in their preferences for the various
request types; however, the captain groups differed in the extent to which they adopted the
strategies (,)(2(16, N = 755) = 33.46; p < .01). Similarly, first officers from the three
airlines agreed in their most frequent strategies but differed in their overall distribution
(X2(16, N = 814) = 48.62; p < .0001). This difference appears to be predominately due to
the use of commands: first officers from airline 3 issued commands 4.5% of the time as
compared to 14.6% and 13% for first officers from airlines 1 and 2.
tTomplexity_ of the communications. A 3 (airline) x 2 (crew position) analysis of
variance on the number of complex communications was performed. There was a main
effect of airline (F(2,138) = 4.86; p < .01) and of crew position (F(1,138) = 6.04; p <
.05). The first main effect implies that if captains and first officers are considered together,
pilots from the three airlines differed in the extent to which they used complex rather than
simple communications. Pairwise Scheffe tests revealed that pilots from airline 1 made
more complex communications than pilots from airline 3. This effect may reflect
differences in company policy or it may be accounted for in terms of differences in aviation
experience. Follow-up analyses are planned to investigate the impact of years of aviation
experience in this context.
In addition to an airline effect, we also found that crew position influenced the
structure of pilot communication. Complex communications were more frequent for
captains (M - 5) than for first officers (M - 4). Further analyses revealed that complex
communications frequently involved some fairly direct request in conjunction with some
form of justification. 68% of commands by captains occurred in complex rather than in
simple communications. Command plus reference to some problem or goal that
necessitates the command is certainly a very explicit form of communication. In addition to
its informativeness, there are also social benefits. By providing some objective reason for
their commands, captains shift the locus of control away from their status to some external
need and thus mitigate the social impact of the command. The social function of complex
communications is even more apparent in first officers' speech. If they used direct request
strategies, then they also provided some justification. For instance, 83% of their
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commands and 72% of their crew directives were embedded in complex constructions.
Less direct strategies, such as queries, could occur either in complex (51%) or in simple
constructions (49%). Indirect requests were mainly done in simple constructions (70%).
Are there gender-specific differences in strategy use?
Our research on this issue has been described in a paper entitled "How to challenge
the captain's actions" that we presented at the Ninth International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology. Since a copy of this paper can be found in Appendix A, only a brief summary
of the results will be given here, followed by a description of analyses that have been done
since the publication.
Unlike previous work on gender differences in communication strategies, we did
not find that female pilots were more indirect than male pilots. In our study, directness and
indirectness were aligned with status not with gender. However, we did find gender
differences among pilots with respect to the structure of their communications. Female
pilots, in particular female captains, were more likely than their male colleagues to motivate
their requests by referring to some objective need.
In subsequent analyses we investigated whether male and female pilots varied their
request strategies and the structure of their communications with the perceived risk of a
situation. For each participant, we divided the scenarios into three categories based on his
or her ratings: low risk situations had a rating between 1 and 3, medium risk situations
between 4 and 6, and high risk situations between 7 and 9. We then tallied the various
request types that participants gave in response to low-, medium, and high-risk situations
and found that perceived risk did not affect female captains' and first officers' choice of
request type (X2(16, N = 108) = 15.07; ns., and )(2(16, N = 103) = 20.29; ns.;
respectively). However, male captains and first officers preferred different request types
de,pendent on their perception of risk (,h_(14, N = 102) = 27.05; p < .05, for captains, and
)(2(16, N = 101) = 38.29; p < .01 for first officers). In particular, male captains issued
more commands, the riskier the situation. In low risk situations, 5% of their requests were
commands versus 41 and 49 percent in medium and high risk situations. Male first officers
also increased the directness of their communications in response to risky situations. In
low risk situations, 23% of their requests were observations and 19% were problem
statements. In medium risk situations, in contrast, they employed most frequently queries
and problem statements (both 23%), and in high risk situations problem statements (30%)
as well as crew directives (20%).
The structure of the communications were also affected by perceived risk; but
significantly only for female captains (X2(2, N = 80) = 6.86; p < .05). This group of pilots
used complex and simple constructions evenly in response to low risk situations (55 and 45
percent). However, in medium and high risk situations they preferred complex
constructions (87.5 and 82 percent, respectively). Male captains showed the tendency to
employ simple constructions in low risk situations (72%) and to balance their use of simple
and complex communications once perceived risk increased. A similar trend was observed
for male first officers. For female first officers, use of complex constructions peaked in
medium risk situations (69%) and leveled around 50% in low and high risk situations.
Expanding the project to non-U.S, pilots
Presently the study is being conducted in Switzerland, Germany and Great Britain.
A total of 2880 test booklets have been mailed out to representatives of airlines and pilot
unions. Completed booklets are expected to be received by the end of the summer.
For British participants, only minor changes in the test material was necessary to
accommodate British standards of wording and spelling. For German-speaking
participants, all material was translated into German by a native speaker. The German
version was then back-translated into English by a second bilingual speaker. No semantic
differences were found between the back-translation and the original English version. The
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German version was further checked by several Swiss and German pilots for accuracy of
aviation terminology and acceptability of the scenarios to their flight experience. Several
changes were implemented but care was taken to leave the nature of the scenarios unaltered.
The German version of the material is provided in appendix B.
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Appendix A
HOW TO CHALLENGE THE CAPTAIN'S ACTIONS
Ute Fischer*
Georgia Institute of Technology
Judith Orasanu**
NASA-Ames Research Center
On January 13, 1982 an Air Florida Boeing 737 crashed into the Potomac River due to
excessive snow and ice on the airplane and a frozen indicator which gave the crew a false
engine power reading. The aircraft had been de-iced, but 45 minutes had elapsed before it
was cleared for takeoff. The captain had little experience flying in winter weather. While
awaiting their takeoff clearance, the following conversation took place between the crew
(NTSB, 1982):
First Officer: Look how the ice is just hanging on his, ah, back, back there, see that?
(..3
First Officer: See all those icicles on the back there and everything ?
Captain: Yeah.
After a long wait following de-icing, the first officer continued:
First Officer: Boy, this is a, this is a losing battle here on trying to de-ice those things, it
(gives) you a false feeling of security, that's all that it does.
Shortly after being given clearance to take off, the first officer again expressed his concern:
First Officer: Let's check those tops again since we've been sitting here awhile.
Captain: I think we get to go here in a minute.
Finally, while they were on their takeoff roll, the first officer noticed that something was wrong with the
engine readings.
First Officer: That don't seem right, does it? [three second pause] Ah, that's not right..
Captain: Yes, it is, there's 80.
First Officer: Naw, 1 don't think that's right. [seven-second pause] Ah, maybe it is.
Captain: Hundred and twenty.
First Officer: I don't know.
The first officer's references to "ice," "icicles," and "false sense of security" indicate
that he was apparently quite aware of the dangerous weather conditions. Yet he did not
succeed in getting the captain to take his concerns seriously or to act on them. Nor did he
succeed in convincing the captain that there was something wrong with the engine power
reading.
Why were the first officer's communications unsuccessful? One possible reason might
be that he used indirect speech. He only hinted at the possibility of a problem rather than
stating explicitly what he suspected and what he thought should be done; nor did he
challenge the captain's decision to continue with the takeoff. There are two potential
problems associated with indirect language use. (1) While direct, explicit utterances have
only one meaning, indirect utterances have at least two: one meaning concerns what
speakers explicitly say, the other concerns what they actually mean. Listeners thus have to
infer what speakers mean from what is explicitly said (Searle, 1975), and they may err in
this point. Most notably, listeners may not realize the indirectness of an utterance and may
instead take an utterance at face value, thus misunderstanding what speakers intended. (2)
Indirect speech is less forceful and more polite than direct speech. Listeners, on the other
hand, may mistake politeness for indecisiveness and consequently may not take the implied
intention seriously enough. This problem was prevalent in an analysis of crew discourse
by Linde (1988) who observed that captains were less likely to act on first officers'
suggestions when they were indirect than when they were direct.
* Work supported by NASA cooperative agreement No. NCC 2-933
** Work supported by NASA, Code UL
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From Linde's (1988) observations we may be inclined to conclude that effective
communication between crew members ought to be maximally explicit and direct. The
demand for explicit and direct communication, however, underestimates the important role
that social considerations play in interactions. As Watzlavick, Beavin and Jackson (1967)
have pointed out, every utterance has two components: the referential which makes some
predication about the world, and the relational, by which we signal something about our
social relationship to the addressee. Communication is not just a matter of what we say; it
is also how we say it that determines the received message. Moreover, whether or not we
are successful in our communications depends critically on the extent to which we can
accommodate both the referential and the relational component. This is particularly true in
situations in which we place demands at our listeners, for instance when we want them to
change their behavior. In these situations we want our listeners not only to understand our
intentions but we also want them to act accordingly. How speakers can best assure listener
cooperation varies with their relationship. Superiors, by virtue of their social status, may
be licensed to give direct commands to their subordinates. However, if subordinates
reverted to the same linguistic strategy, superiors may perceive them as threatening and
may refuse compliance. To avoid this kind of confrontation, subordinates are likely to use
more polite and as such more indirect ways of communicating (Brown & Levinson, 1987).
However, as we elaborated above, by being indirect, subordinates run the risk of being
misunderstood or of not being heard.
There is thus a tension between informative communication and socially successful
ways of communicating. We suggest that effective communication seeks to optimize
informativeness and social appropriateness. How this can be achieved in crew discourse
was the topic of our present research. In this research project we attempted to understand
how fast officers could effectively challenge the actions of captains, and how first officers'
and captains' strategies differ. In addition, we were interested in determining whether male
and female pilots have distinct notions of what constitutes effective behavior in this context.
Sociolinguistic studies on gender differences in discourse strategies have reported that men
are more explicit, directive and task-oriented than women. Talk by women has been
characterized as indirect and concerned with relational aspects of interactions (Lakoff,
1975; Tannen, 1990, 1992). In this research we wanted to see whether these observations
generalize to crew discourse.
METHOD
participants
Female pilots were recruited by placing a call for participation in the ISA newsletter. 21
pilots responded to the ad and completed the experimental material. There were 10 captains
and 11 first officers. The captains had on average 3.6 years in this position and had an
average of 11 years of experience in Part 121 aircraft. For the first officers, position-
specific experience was on average 6.3 years, and experience in Part 121 was 8.9 years.
Male pilots matching the female sample in experience, were taken from a larger sample
of 162 male respondents. The 10 male captains that were selected had on average 3.6 years
of experience in this position and 14 years of experience in part 121. Position-specific
experience and part 121 experience for first officers was on average 5.7 and 8.6 years,
respectively.
Material
Eight short vignettes were constructed that described aviation incidents. These
incidents varied in type and severity of a problem. For captain participants, incidents were
described from the perspective of the captain and involved errors or oversights of the first
officer, the pilot-flying. The reverse was true for first officer participants. The vignettes
were printed in a test booklet, one vignette per page. There was a captain edition and a first
officers' edition. Random orders of the vignettes were created yielding 16 differently
ordered captains' and first officers' booklets.
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Method and Procedure
Participants were asked to complete two tasks: a Discourse Completion Task and then
a Judgment Task. In the Discourse Completion Task, participants received the incident
descriptions and were asked to imagine themselves in the position of the captain (or first
officer - dependent on the crew position of the participant). Each incident description was
followed by a goal statement and the participants were asked to write out verbatim what
they would say to the first officer (or the captain) in order to achieve the stated goal. For
instance, captain participants saw the following description and goal statement:
While cruising in IMC at FL 310, you notice on the weather radar an area of heavy precipitation 25
miles ahead. First Officer Henry Jones, who is flying the aircraft, is maintaining his present course at
Mach .73.
You want to ensure that your aircraft will not penetrate this area.
The second part of a test booklet consisted of a Judgment Task in which participants
rated the scenarios along various scales, such as problem severity. Results from the
judgment task will not be reported in this paper.
Analyses
Request _types. Recall that each incident description was followed by a goal statement
that should be realized by the participants' communications. In coding the responses we
therefore noted whether a speaker specified what action should be taken and whether the
action is to be taken by him- or herself, the listener, or by the crew (Blum-Kulka, 1987;
Clark, 1979). Responses were further classified based on the extent to which they
committed the speaker, the listener or the crew to a particular action (Herrmann &
Grabowski, 1994). For example, compare "I'll call ATC" with "Do you want me to call
ATC?" In the former utterance, the speaker expresses a strong commitment to calling ATC
and virtually takes the listener's acceptance for granted. Speaker commitment is much
weaker in the latter utterance with which the speaker seeks the listener's permission to call
ATC. Similarly, "Turn left for the weather" and "Do you want to turn right or left around
this weather?" place the listener under different obligations to comply with the speaker's
intentions. The major categories that we distinguished are summarized in Table 1:
TABLE 1
Examples of Request Types
Commands & Statements of lntent
3rd Party Commands
Suggestions
Confirmation-Seeking Questions
Permission-Seeking _uestions
Alerters
Strong Hints
Problem Statements & Problem
Inquiries
Goal Statements
Mild Hints
Observations and Questions
-- Turn right back to the iocalizer.
-- rll call ATC
-- He (= controller) wants us to turn left now.
-- Let's correct back on course.
--Didn't you want to fly at V-Ref plus 15 for
winds?
-- Should I ask ATC if he'll give us direct?
--Watch your speed!
-- Altitude!
-- We're well left of course and there is parallel
traffic.
-- Do you think they still want us on this heading?
-- We were assigned 9000 ft.
-- Do we have anyone on the approach for the
parallel runwa),?
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Complexity of the communications. Participants could use either one or several
utterances to achieve the goal that was stated after each incident description. If there were
several utterances we noted their relationship. Typically one utterance was the principal
part, or primary move, that realized the stated intention, and the other parts provided
justification. Consider for example the following response: "We've got parallel traffic off
our left. Turn right heading xxx to intercept the localizer." Here the goal of getting the
aircraft back on the assigned approach course is realized by the command. The italicized
segments provide reasons for the command and are thus supportive moves. We called
responses involving primary and supportive moves, complex communications. A variation
of complex responses consisted of several primary moves which together realized the stated
intention but in which one also gave a rationale for the other. For example in "What's your
plan with regard to the weather? We shouM turn soon," the second part not only constrains
what should be done concerning the weather (= the goal) but also justifies why the question
has been asked in the first place. Simple communications were responses in which a given
goal was realized by a single utterance, i.e., a single primary move, as in "Level offnow!"
or "WouM you like me to request direct?" Alternatively, simple communications could also
involve several primary moves which provided distinct directives, for example when
speakers allocated responsibilities as in "Level off here. I'll call ATC."
RESULTS
Reliabili _tyof coding. Two coders independently classified responses by 10
participants. Percent agreement was calculated on their ratings and found to be 91%. One
coder subsequently classified the remaining responses.
Do captains and first officers use different request types? The answer to this question
is yes. Captains used most frequently commands (37%), suggestions of the "Let's type"
(19%), or stated their intention to perform some action (14%). The majority of the
intention statements, however, were combined with commands (e.g., "Climb immediately
to 12,000. Then I'll check our course!"), or suggestions (e.g., "Let's climb back up to xxx
feet. I'U calI ATC and let them know."). First officers, in contrast, most commonly
provided goal or problem statements (27%), or asked the captain whether he wanted them
to perform some action (14%). A third request type observed for first officers were
confirmation-seeking questions (13%) such as "Do you still want V-Ref + 15 ?"
Do female and male pilots use different request types? The answer to this question is
no. Our analyses indicate that status rather than gender influenced how pilots phrased
requests. 35% of female captains' requests were commands and 20% were suggestions;
for male captains the corresponding percentages were 39 and 18. First officers were
equally similar: 29% of the female and 25% of the male first officers' requests were
problem and goal statements. For permission-seeking questions the percentages were 15%
for the females and 14% for the males; for confirmation-seeking questions the percentages
were 13% for both groups.
Are there status and gender effects pertaining to the structure of the cQmmunicati0ns?
Gender but no status differences were observed in the way pilots structured their
communications. A 2 x 2 between subjects analysis of variance on number of complex
respSnses revealed that the structure of the communications varied significantly with the
gender of the respondents, F(1,38) = 7.9, 12< .01), but not with their status, F( 1,38) =
1.48, ns.; nor was there a significant gender by status interaction, F(1,38) = 1.23, ns.
As Table 2 shows, on average 5.3 (from a total of 8) responses by female pilots were
complex, i.e., consisted of request and justifications as compared to 3.7 responses by male
pilots. Since communications could either be complex or simple, this result also implies
that female pilots were less likely than male pilots to state requests without also providing
some justification.
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TABLE 2
Mean Number of Responses Involving Request plus Justification
FEMALE MALE
CAPTAINS 6.00 (1.25) 3.70 (2.45)
FIRST OFFICERS 4.64 (1.80) 3.64 (1.91)
Note. Standard Deviations are given in parentheses; Total Number of Responses per Group = 8
DISCUSSION
In this study we examined what linguistic strategies pilots use when they have to
challenge the actions of a colleague, and how their communications balance the need for
informativeness with the need for assuring the other's cooperation.
Two strategies emerged for captains. They either gave commands or they made
suggestions that referred to actions of the crew. Both strategies explicitly state what action
should be taken but they differ in their social implications. Commands are direct insofar as
they entail a strong obligation for the listener to comply with the speaker's request.
Suggestions are less direct in this respect. However, by using the collegial "Let's do,"
speakers appeal to the solidarity between themselves and their listeners and seek
compliance in this way. Commands, in contrast, are inherently authoritative and imply an
asymmetry in status. Speakers by giving a command, express their belief that they are
socially more powerful than their listeners and that they are thus licensed to command.
That is, speakers seek listener compliance by appeal to their status. Status-based
commands were more frequent among male captains than among female captains. Female
captains instead were likely to shift the motivation for their commands away from their
status to some objective necessity by referring to some problem or goal
It remains to be seen, however, how captains' strategies were affected by the severity
of a problem situation. Results in a preliminary study involving only male participants,
suggests that pilots increased the directness of their utterances in situations that they
perceived to be risky (Fischer, 1996). Thus the observation that male captains used
complex communications half of the time while female captains did so 75% of the time,
could indicate that male captains were more likely than female captains to change their
strategies with the severity of situations.
Both male and female first officers in this study were less direct than captains. The
most common strategy of first officers was to point to some problem or to remind the
captain of a given goal. What corrective action should be taken and by whom was not
explicitly stated but implied and left to the captain. In their other strategies, permission-
seeking and confirmation-seeking questions, first officers were more explicit about a
corrective action. In the first case, they volunteered to do some course of action but left the
final decision to the captain. In the latter case, they inquired or confirmed whether the
captain wanted some action. Although all three strategies seek the compliance of the
listener by appeal to his authority, there are important differences: By asking permission-
seeking and confirmation-seeking questions, first officers specify the action for which they
wani the captain's compliance. Compliance, however, is not demanded but requested. By
alerting to a problem or to a goal, in contrast, first officers seek the captain's compliance
only with their assessment of the situation but not with a particular course of action. That
is, they place the captain under no explicit obligation to initiate a corrective action but do so
only indirectly by assuming that a course of action is self-evident once the problem has
been acknowledged.
CONCLUSIONS
In line with previous research (Linde, 1988; Orasanu & Fischer, 1992), we found that
captains are more direct in their communications than first officers. But unlike previous
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work on gender differences in communication strategies (Lakoff, 1975; Tannen, 1990,
1992), we did not find that female pilots were more indirect than male pilots. In our study
directness and indirectness were aligned with status not with gender. However, we did
find gender differences among pilots with respect to the structure of their communications.
Female pilots were more likely than male pilots to motivate their requests by referring to
some objective need.
One question that our present analyses have not yet addressed concerns the relation
between linguistic strategy and features of the problem situation. In particular, we need to
analyze whether our participants responded differently in low-risk and high-risk situations.
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Appendix B
German Version of the Material
LOW FACE-THREATENING SITUATIONS
LOW-RISK
#1
Dieser Flugabschnitt wird von Erstem Offizier Han:
Fischer geflogen. Ihr Flugzeug ist in seiner
Reiseflugh6he von FL 350 in VMC, als Sie
feststellen, dab Ihr Flug immer noch einem
Vektorkurs folgt, den die ATC Ihnen vor einiger
Zeit gegeben hat. Eine Freigabe, zum
ursprOnglichen Flugplan zurtickzukehren, ist
unterblieben. Die Abweichung vom geplanten
Kurs betr_igt inzwischen 20 NM. Erster Offizier
Fischer hat anscheinend das Problem noch nicht
bemerkt.
#3
Ihr Flugzeug befindet sich in einer Reiseflugh6he
von FL 310 in IMC, als Sie auf dem Wetterradar 25
Meilen vor Ihnen ein Gebiet mit starkem
Niederschlag bemerken. Erster Offizier Ernst
Huber, der das Flugzeug steuert, h_iit seinen
gegenw_irtigen Kurs mit Reisegeschwin-digkeit.
#5-
lhr Flugzeug befindet sich im Descent und
durchfliegt gerade 10'000 ft. in VMC. Ihre
gegenw_'tige Richtung ist 360 °, als die ATC
llmen, wegen Verkehrsdichte, eine Vektor'anderung
gibt und Sie anweist, nach rechts auf 330 ° zu
drehen. In dem Moment, in dem Karl Miiller, der
Erste Offizier, die Rechtskurve initiiert, meldet sich
der Controller wieder und gibt zu, einen Fehler
gemacht zu haben: Er m6chte, dab Ihr Flugzeug
nach links dreht. Erster Offizier MOiler hat diese
Berichtigung anscheinend nicht geh6rt und setzt die
Rechtskurve fort.
#7
Erster Offizier Martin Weber steuert das Flugzeug.
Unterwegs, als sich Ihr Flug-zeug in ReiseflughOhe
befindet, fragt Sie die ATC nach Ihrer Estimated
Time for den Waypoint Charlie, eine Position, die
nicht in Ihrem Flugplan vorkommt. In diesem
Moment wird Ihnen klar, dab Sie beide eine frOhere
Clearance miBver-standen haben, und _ Ihre
Kursab-weichung bereits mehrere Meilen betr_igt.
HIGH-RISK
#2
Dieser Flugabschnitt wird yon Erstem Offizier Hans
Fischer geflogen. Ihr Flugzeug befindet sich im
Descent auf einen Flughafen, der von Bergen bis zu
8000 ft. H6he umgeben ist. Ihr Flugzeug
durchfliegt gerade 10'000 ft., ais Sie feststellen, NaB
Ihr Flug immer noch einem Vektorkurs folgt, den
die ATC Ihnen vor einiger Zeit gegeben hat. Eine
Freigabe, zum ursprOnglichen Flugplan zurtickzu-
kehren, ist unterblieben. Die Abweichung vom
geplanten Kurs betr_igt inzwischen 20 NM. Erster
Offizier Fischer hat anscheinend das Problem noch
nicht bemerkt.
#4
Ihr Flugzeug befindet sich in einer Reiseflugh6he
von FL 310 in IMC, als Sie auf dem Wetterradar 25
Meilen vor Ihnen ein Gebiet mit starkem
Niederschlag bemerken. Erster Offizier Ernst
Huber, der das Flugzeug steuert, h_ilt seinen
gegenw_irtigen Kurs mit Reisegeschwin-digkeit,
obwohl eingelagerte Gewitter in Ihrer Umgebung
gemeldet wurden, und Sie auf maBig starke
Turbulenzen stol3en.
#6
Il_ Flug hat die Starterlaubnis erhalten. Flugzeuge,
die vor Ihnen gestartet waren, meldeten Gewitter
rechts der Abflugroute. Auf 1500 ft. H6he, kurz
nach l]u'em Takeoff yon Startbahn 36, weist Sie
Departure Control an, nach rechts auf 330 ° zu
drehen. In dem Moment, in dem Karl M_ller, der
Erste Offizier, die Rechtskurve initiiert, meldet sich
der Controller wieder und gibt zu, einen Fehler
gemacht zu haben: Er mtichte, dab Ihr Flugzeug
nach links dreht. Erster Offizier M011er hat diese
Berichtigung anscheinend nicht geh_Srt und setzt die
Rechtskurve fort.
#8
Erster Offizier Martin Weber steuert das Flugzeug.
Sie befinden sich im Descent auf einen Flughafen,
der yon Bergen bis zu 10'000 ft. Htihe umgeben ist.
Wetter-bedingungen sind IMC. Ais Sie 12'000 ft.
durchfliegen, fragt Sie die ATC nach Ihrer
Estimated Time ftir den Waypoint Charlie, eine
Position, die nicht in Ihrem Flugplan vorkommt.
In diesem Moment wird Ihnen klar, dab Sie beide
eine frfihere Clearance miBverstanden haben, und
dab Ihre Kursabweichung bereits mehrere Meilen
betr_gt.
Fischer• Variationi CrewCommunication° 13
HIGHFACE-THREATENINGSITUATIONS
LOW-RISK HIGH-RISK
#11
Erster Offizier Arno Schmidt steuert das Flugzeug.
Nach dem Start weist Sie Departure Control an, auf
9000 ft. zu steigen und diese HOhe bis auf weiteres
zu halten. In 8500 ft. HShe teilt man Ihnen mit,
dab sich anderer Flugverkehr 60 ° links von Ihnen
auf 12'000 ft. H6he im Steigflug befindet.
Nachdem Sie das andere Flug-zeug ausgemacht
haben, iaberschauen Sie Dare Bordinstrumente und
bemerken, dab Erster Offizier Schmidt 9200 ft.
durch-fliegt mit einer Steigungsrate yon 1200
ft./min.
#13
Sie sind auf einem Langstreckenflug unter VMC.
Ihr Fiugzeug befindet sich in Reiseflugh6he, als Sie
bemerken, dab der Autopilot unregelm_il]ig arbeitet,
und dab Erster Offizier Peter Zimmer, der Pilot-
Flying, eingeschlafen ist.
#15
W_flarend des Anflugs auf Ihren Ziel-flughafen
meldet der Controller Regen-schauer und berichtet,
dab das Flugzeug 5 Meilen vor Ihnen kurz vor der
Landung in m_al3igstarke Turbulenzen geraten ist.
In1000 ft. Htihe bemerken Sie, dab Erster Offizier
Paul Kr6ger mit normaler Approach Speed fliegt,
obwohl Sie wahrend des Briefings beschlossen
hatten, den Anflug mit einer um 15 kts erh6hten
Geschwindigkeit durchzuftihren
#17
Sie fliegen in VMC Ihren Zielflughafen mit zwei
Parallelpisten an. Der Controller weist Sie an, den
I.x_alizer der linken Landebahn aufzunehmen und
ihm zu folgen. Er macht Sie auch darauf
aufmerksam, dab parallele AnfliJge auf die rechte
Landebahn durchgefiihrt werden. Sie bemerken, dab
Erster Offizier Oskar Walter 1 dot links vom Kurs
fliegt und die Abweichung nicht ausgleicht.
#12
Erster Offizier Arno Schmidt steuert das Flugzeug.
Nach dem Start weist Sie Departure Control an, auf
9000 ft. zu steigen und diese Hi, he bis auf weiteres
zu halten. In 8500 ft. H6he teilt man Ihnen mit,
dab sich anderer Flugverkehr leicht links von Ihnen
auf 12'000 ft. H6he befindet. Nachdem Sie das
andere Flug-zeug ausgemacht haben, tiberschauen
Sie Ihre Bordinstrumente und bemerken, dab Erster
Offizier Schmidt 9800 ft. durch-fliegt mit einer
Steigungsrate yon 2800 ft./min.
#14
Sie sind auf einem Langstreckenflug unter IMC.
Flugzeuge vor Ihnen meldeten m_ige Vereisung
w_u'end dem Descent. Kurz vor Top of Descent
bemerken Sie, dab der Autopilot unregelm_iBig
arbeitet, und dab Erster Offizier Peter Zimmer, der
Pilot-Fl)'in_, eingeschlafen ist.
#16
Wahrend des Anflugs auf Ihren Ziel-flughafen
berichtet der Controller, dab das Flugzeug 5 Meilen
vor Ihnen eine Wind-shear durchflogen hat und kurz
vor der Landung 10 kts an Airspeed verloren hat.
AuBerdem meldet man ein Gewitter, das sich 15
Meilen hinter dem Ende der Landebahn befindet. In
500 ft. H6he bemerken Sie, dab Erster Offizier Paul
Krtiger mit normaler Approach Speed fliegt,
obwohl Sie w_hrend des Briefings beschlossen
hatten, den Anflug mit einer um 15 kts erh6hten
Geschwindil]keit durchzuf'tihren.
#18
Sie fliegen in IMC Ihren Zielflughafen mit zwei
Parailelpisten an. Der Controller weist Sie an, den
Localizer der rechten Landebahn aufzunehmen und
ihm zu folgen. Er macht Sie auch darauf auf-
merksam, dab parallele AnfliJge auf die linke
Landebahn durchgef'tihrt werden. Sie bemerken, dab
Erster Offizier Oskar Walter 1 1/2 dots links vom
Kurs fliegt und auf den Approach Korridor der an-
_enzenden Landebahn zusteuert.
Fragen zu den Situationen
(1) Inwieweit ist der Erste Offizier (fttr die Kursabweichung) verantwortlich?
(2) Wie riskant in bezug auf die Flugsicherheit ist die beschriebene Situation?
(3) Wenn Sie der Flugkapitan in dieser Situation w_'en, inwiefern w_re es Ihne unangenehm, dem Ersten
Offizier zu sagen, (er miisse seinen Kurs berichtigen)?
(4) Inwiefern ist die beschriebene Situation ftir den Ersten Offizier peinlich?
(5) Wie viel Zeit verbleibt, auf die beschriebene Situation zu reagieren?
